Transforming the Skies by Peter Reese

Author:Peter Reese
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: The History Press

Sir Geoffrey Salmond, who succeeded his brother as Chief of the Air Staff before his early death. (Mapson Collection, Library of Congress)

Although the Prime Minister learned of his disloyalty he appreciated Salmond’s fierce dedication to his service and decided to look the other way. Salmond however did not receive the peerage that was his due on retirement.22

Fortunately for the RAF, in spite of the limited effects of Londonderry’s and Salmond’s efforts, there was general disagreement at Geneva over how the participating nations’ civil aeroplanes should be used, especially as Germany was so strong in this respect. And although Germany returned to the conference table in January 1933, Hitler’s appointment as German Chancellor inevitably stiffened his country’s attitude against disarmament measures.

Amazingly this did not prevent Baldwin from making a final and desperate attempt in March 1933 when he told his Cabinet that he saw two great dangers to the country’s safety, aerial bombing and German rearmament – especially in the air – and so he was willing to trade the RAF to remove both of his fears.23

In spite of the heady – and unrealistic – ideas circulating within the British Cabinet, by 1933 the structure laid down at Geneva was unravelling and when in October Germany withdrew from both the conference and the League of Nations all hopes of disarmament ended, and the meeting adjourned permanently in June 1934.

The RAF had been saved at the last minute by external events. Although a CAS with a greater appetite for staff negotiations and a more highly regarded Secretary of State for Air might have put the RAF’s case to greater effect, neither office holder at this time would have been likely to prevail against the senior members of the Government.

At Geneva both Salmond and Londonderry could justly feel they were under siege. Salmond was particularly unfortunate in having taken over from Trenchard, who had seemingly directed the RAF’s affairs for so long – and was commenting critically on his performance – when it was Trenchard’s over-emphasis on the destructive power and devastating psychological impact of bombing that had driven the British Cabinet to seek other solutions. Salmond knew that despite Trenchard’s high hopes, the initial attempts of his independent bombing force during the First World War had been distinctly disappointing and the dire predictions concerning bombing by the Italian air theorist Giulio Douhet and the American flyer Colonel ‘Billy’ Mitchell were also largely unproven. This had not prevented British politicians from accepting the most pessimistic viewpoint. Air commentator Ian Philpott went so far as to believe that the last thing the British Government wanted as the negotiators went to Geneva with disarmament in mind was for their CAS to come up with new developments in air armament.24

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